
Browser Fingerprinting Explained
What browser fingerprinting is, which signals it uses, how to test your browser and what Firefox, Brave, Tor and Safari do to limit it.

Browser fingerprinting is a way for a website to recognize your browser by collecting and combining details about it and your device, instead of storing anything on your computer. Because nothing is stored, clearing your cookies does not remove it.
This guide covers the definition, the signals a fingerprint uses, how to test your own browser, and what Firefox, Brave, Tor Browser and Safari do about it. Sources were checked on October 22, 2026.
The short answer
A fingerprint is built from many small details, such as your browser version, time zone, language, fonts and screen size. Any one detail is common, yet the whole set can point to a single browser.
You cannot reliably eliminate browser fingerprinting, but you can reduce the information websites can collect and make your browser harder to distinguish.
A browser that blocks or limits fingerprinting, plus a test on EFF's Cover Your Tracks tool, is a practical start.
Do not install tools that change your browser's reported identity without testing them. EFF warns that a fake identity can make you stand out.
Browser fingerprinting definition
MDN's glossary defines fingerprinting as picking out a particular browser, and through it a particular user, by gathering and combining features that set the browser and its operating system apart.
The W3C's guidance uses a broader wording. It describes fingerprinting as a site's ability to recognize a visitor, browser or device again from its settings or other observable traits.
What goes into a fingerprint
MDN lists examples of what a fingerprint might include. Any one of these is ordinary, and the combination is what identifies you.
Browser version
The version of the browser you are running.
Time zone and language
Your time zone and preferred language.
Media support
The video or audio codecs available on your system.
Fonts
Which typefaces are installed on your machine.
Settings
How the browser's options are configured.
Display
The size and resolution of your screen.
EFF puts it as a set of traits that belong to one person's browser and hardware. It adds that seemingly insignificant data, like screen resolution and installed fonts, is stitched together by tracking scripts.
Passive and active fingerprinting
The W3C describes two kinds of fingerprinting, and defenses treat them differently.
Passive
Based on what is observable in web requests, with no code running on your device. The W3C says it includes cookies, request headers, the IP address and other network details.
Active
A site runs JavaScript or other code on your device to observe more about the browser, user or device. The W3C notes that CSS features have also been used for fingerprinting.
For some groups of people, the W3C notes, the User-Agent string and IP address together often identify one browser on their own.
Browser fingerprinting examples
| Signal | What it reveals | Type |
|---|---|---|
| User-Agent header | Browser, version and operating system | Passive |
| IP address | Network location | Passive |
| Time zone and language | Where you probably are | Active |
| Installed fonts | A set that differs between computers | Active |
| Screen size and resolution | Your display setup | Active |
| Codec support | What media your system can play | Active |
The Type column follows the W3C's definitions, applied by us to each signal. A signal that needs code on your device is active, and one visible in the request itself is passive.
Why clearing cookies does not help
Why small details add up
This is an illustration, not a measurement. Suppose one setting is shared by one browser in ten. If three such details were independent, only about one browser in a thousand would match all three.
Real details are not independent, so real numbers differ. What matters is the combination: when several signals are distinguishing enough, they can narrow the crowd you blend into.
A signal almost everyone shares adds little, and signals that move together add less than independent ones. That is why the W3C talks about increasing the anonymity set.
A cookie is stored on your device, so you can delete it. EFF uses an analogy of a tracking tag that can be knocked off.
A fingerprint is computed from what a site can observe, so there is nothing for you to delete.
FingerprintJS, an open-source library, shows the idea in practice. It says its identifier stays the same in private mode and when browser data is purged, unlike cookies and local storage.
That is the project's own claim, tested on its own setup. Results depend on your browser, its settings and any privacy protections, so treat it as an illustration and not a guarantee.
Browser fingerprinting test
EFF's Cover Your Tracks is a tool for understanding how unique and identifiable your browser makes you online. It is also a research project on the techniques of online trackers.
Run it, note the result, change one setting or browser, and run it again under the same conditions, such as the same window and settings.
Treat a single result as a snapshot and not a verdict, because browsers and trackers keep changing.
A distinctive result does not prove you can be tracked, and a good result does not prove you cannot. A browser can resist tracking effectively even when a test still calls its fingerprint distinctive.
Browser fingerprinting on GitHub
FingerprintJS is public on GitHub under the MIT license. It reads attributes from the browser and turns them into a hashed visitor identifier.
The attributes are the raw signals, and the identifier is a number derived from them. The project page links to a demo you can try yourself.
Open the demo, note the identifier, then open it in a private window. The project says the identifier stays the same.
Treat your own result as a demonstration for your browser and settings, not a rule. The identifier can change when your settings, exposed attributes or privacy protections change.
How browsers fight fingerprinting
Firefox
Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection blocks scripts on Disconnect's fingerprinting list in normal browsing, and limits the information the browser exposes to counter suspected fingerprinters. Both protections apply in Private Browsing and in Strict mode.
Brave
Brave says it blocks, removes or modifies some APIs so instances look alike, and randomizes other values. Brave's randomization is seeded per session, per site and per storage area. Brave calls this a best-effort defense.
Tor Browser
Tor Browser's manual describes letterboxing, which makes it harder to single users out by screen size, and spoofing of the User-Agent and operating system.
Safari
WebKit, Safari's engine, says it looks for fingerprinting vulnerabilities as it adds web features, and that most of its tracking prevention is on by default.
Firefox warns that its protection can break some sites. For example, scripts that detect emoji support may fail to detect it.
Why blocking is hard
The W3C is direct about the limits. It says that completely eliminating fingerprinting by a determined adversary, using only widely deployed technical means, is implausible, and that its mitigations are mitigations and not solutions.
Its guidance names three approaches. Reduce the data a site can read. Make browsers look more alike, which it calls increasing the anonymity set. Make fingerprinting detectable so that it can be spotted and blocked.
How to avoid browser fingerprinting
This section is our advice, built on the sources above.
Pick a browser with built-in protection
Firefox, Brave, Tor Browser and Safari all document fingerprinting defenses.
Keep it updated
Protection lists and techniques change over time.
Be careful with spoofing add-ons
EFF warns that a fake identity can stand out.
Test, change one thing, test again
Cover Your Tracks shows whether a change helped.
Know the trade-off
Stronger protection, such as Firefox's Strict mode, can break some sites.
EFF's guide names the Tor Browser as the most realistic protection it knew of, and suggests Privacy Badger or NoScript for daily use. That page is undated, so check each browser's own documentation for what it does today.
What a realistic plan looks like
This section is our advice, matched to how much effort you want to spend.
Five minutes
Use a browser that documents fingerprinting protection and keep it updated.
Thirty minutes
Test on Cover Your Tracks, try a stricter setting such as Firefox's Strict mode, and test again.
Maximum effort
Tor Browser, which EFF names as the most realistic protection, with the caveat that it changes how many sites behave.
Fingerprinting attempts you may notice
You rarely see a fingerprinting attempt directly. Firefox's documentation describes the fingerprinter lists it blocks, and Brave and Tor Browser handle the problem in the background.
Related guides
Fingerprinting is one of the three main web tracking methods. Our guide to how online tracking works compares it with cookies and pixels. On a phone, our guide to App Tracking Transparency covers the apps side.
Canvas and WebGL fingerprinting
Two techniques give a fingerprint much of its power. In canvas fingerprinting, a page draws hidden text and shapes and reads back the pixels. Small differences in fonts, graphics drivers and rendering software make the result differ between machines.
WebGL fingerprinting does something similar with 3D graphics. A page can ask which graphics renderer the browser is using, and test how it draws. Neither technique shows anything on screen, and neither needs a cookie.
A test you can reproduce
I wrote a short script that draws a canvas, reads the graphics renderer and collects ordinary browser settings.
I ran it in headless Chromium, twice with identical settings and once with a different language, time zone, screen and user agent. Each run started with a fresh browser profile and no stored data.
| Run | Canvas hash | Whole fingerprint |
|---|---|---|
| A, default settings | f0273c4e3402 | 8752035de2e8 |
| B, same settings again | f0273c4e3402 | 8752035de2e8 |
| C, different language, time zone, screen and user agent | 5458d3f57e6f | d4d3dec1a357 |
Runs A and B produced identical results even though both started clean, with no cookies and no history. The fingerprint came from the browser and the machine, not from stored data.
Run C changed the language, the time zone, the user agent and the pixel ratio, and the canvas hash changed with them.
The graphics renderer in my test was a software one, so my machine looked generic. On a real computer, the renderer string usually names the graphics hardware, which adds identifying detail.
This was a simple test on one machine, so treat it as an illustration and not a measurement of how unique anyone is.
How much does a fingerprint reveal?
Each attribute narrows the crowd. An attribute shared by half of all browsers adds one bit of information. One shared by one in a thousand adds ten bits. Bits add up across independent attributes.
| Shared by | Information added |
|---|---|
| 1 in 2 browsers | 1.0 bits |
| 1 in 10 browsers | 3.3 bits |
| 1 in 50 browsers | 5.6 bits |
| 1 in 1,000 browsers | 10.0 bits |
About 33 bits are enough to single out one person among 8 billion. That is my arithmetic, and attributes are not fully independent, so real figures differ.
The point is that a handful of mildly unusual settings can add up fast.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation's Cover Your Tracks project, formerly called Panopticlick, studies exactly this. It analyzes how unique your browser looks compared with other visitors, and it began as a 2010 research project on browser uniqueness.
Why the usual habits fall short
Private browsing windows start with no stored data, which is what my test did, and the fingerprint stayed the same.
So a private window does not change what the site can measure about your device. This is our reading of the test, and browsers differ in what extra protection they add.
A VPN changes your network address. That is one attribute among many, so the rest of the fingerprint still travels with you. Clearing cookies has no effect on a fingerprint, because none of it is stored on your device.
Two defensive strategies
Defenses fall into two camps. The first is to make many people look the same. If every browser in a group reports the same values, the fingerprint no longer separates them.
The second is to add noise, so that the values change from one visit to the next and cannot be matched.
Both have costs. Making browsers look alike can mean hiding useful details such as your exact screen size or fonts.
Adding noise can break sites that rely on canvas drawing, such as image editors and games, and some sites treat inconsistent results as a sign of fraud.
What to do today
These steps are our advice. None is perfect, and combining them helps more than any one.
Keep your browser updated
Updates add tracking protections and fix leaks.
Use the built-in protection
Check your browser's privacy settings for fingerprinting or tracker blocking, and read its documentation for what it covers.
Limit extensions
Each extension and unusual setting adds to your uniqueness, so install few.
Avoid rare customizations
An unusual font list, an odd window size or a rare language setting makes you easier to pick out.
Separate your browsing
Use different browser profiles for work, shopping and social media, so one fingerprint does not follow you everywhere.
Test yourself
Run the Cover Your Tracks test, and treat the result as a snapshot of that moment.
Fingerprinting is not always sinister
Some sites use fingerprints to protect you. A bank can notice that a login comes from a device it has never seen and ask for extra proof.
That is also why blocking every signal can cause trouble, such as repeated security checks.
The line between fraud prevention and tracking is about purpose and consent. Our guides to online tracking and to app tracking transparency cover related controls.
Frequently asked questions
What is browser fingerprinting?
It is identifying a browser by collecting and combining details of the browser and the system underneath it, such as its version, fonts, time zone and screen size.
How does fingerprinting differ from cookies?
No. Cookies are stored on your device and can be deleted. A fingerprint is computed from observable details, so it is not stored on your device.
Can I block browser fingerprinting completely?
Not with certainty. The W3C calls full elimination implausible, but browsers can limit it.
Does private mode stop it?
Not by itself. FingerprintJS says its identifier stays the same in private mode, though results vary by browser and settings.
How do I test my browser?
Use EFF's Cover Your Tracks, change one thing, and test again.
Does private browsing stop fingerprinting?
Not by itself. In my test, a fresh profile with no stored data produced the same fingerprint twice.
Does a VPN hide my fingerprint?
It changes your network address, which is one attribute. Your browser and device details still travel with you.
How can I check my fingerprint?
Use the Electronic Frontier Foundation's Cover Your Tracks test, and treat the result as a snapshot.
A quick checklist
Sources
- EFF: Cover Your Tracks
- MDN: Fingerprinting (glossary)
- W3C: Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications
- EFF Cover Your Tracks: Learn
- EFF Cover Your Tracks
- FingerprintJS on GitHub
- Mozilla Support: Firefox's protection against fingerprinting
- Brave: Fingerprinting Protections
- Tor Browser Manual: Fingerprinting protections
- WebKit: Tracking Prevention
From circuittimes.com/security/browser-fingerprinting/
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